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The main contribution of this study is showing that the efficiency effects of collective 
performance-related pay (CPRP) are more pronounced in knowledge-intensive service 
sectors (KISs) than in other sectors. The hypothesis is that human resource practices 
such as CPRP are particularly useful for enhancing firm performance when 
innovation-supporting knowledge is distributed among multiple skill sets and employee 
creativity, knowledge creation and knowledge sharing are key success factors for the 
firm. Cross-sectional estimates obtained for a national sample of approximately 3,800 
Italian firms confirm this prediction. These results are validated by adopting a 
treatment effect approach to solve the self-selection problem. 
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1. Introduction 
Studies of performance-oriented human resource management (HRM) systems have 
gained ground in recent decades (Bryson et al. 2013). Despite mixed findings, there has 
been a substantial body of strategic HRM research suggesting that high-performance or 
high-investment HRM systems (which typically include performance-related 
payments) can enhance knowledge generation, learning and teamwork; these, in turn, 
affect firm performance (e.g., Collins and Smith 2006; Liu, Gong and Huang 2017; see 
also Datta, Guthrie, and Wright 2005). Furthermore, research has previously found that 
collective performance-related pay (CPRP) can foster information and knowledge 
sharing among employees (e.g., Pearsall et al. 2010). Thus, it is a natural extension of 
the existing literature to surmise that performance-related payments will work better in 
a context that requires a high level of knowledge creation and sharing. 
However, an issue that is both interesting and under-studied concerns the different 
effects of incentive pay schemes across industries, especially those that may play a 
strategic role in a knowledge economy. Indeed, although HRM systems (including 
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compensation incentives) are ubiquitous, there are no prior studies that have focused 
on the role of wage incentives (individual and/or collective) in predicting the 
heterogeneous influence of these systems on economic performance across sectors. 
In this paper, we argue that there is a need to redirect incentive research to include a 
consideration of sectoral factors. We expect that in sectors where complex knowledge 
and multiple sets of skills are important capabilities for firms, the proper design of the 
compensation structure and the adoption of commitment-based HRM practices may be 
particularly influential on firm survival and success (Collins and Smith 2006)i. Indeed, 
organizational competencies, intellectual capital and the socialization of tacit 
knowledge among employees are strategical tools (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998), and 
the reward system can be designed to encourage creation, sharing and utilization of this 
local knowledge. 
This issue has important implications in market services, where the proportion of high-
skilled workers has doubled or tripled in recent decades (European Commission, 2012). 
Particularly in knowledge-intensive sectors (KISs), the largest changes have been 
frequently characterized as skill-biased (Inklaar, Timmer, and Van Ark 2008). 
Furthermore, in KISs, innovative activities rely on projects, involve teams of workers 
that must effectively interact with one another and are, in general terms, less formal 
than R&D activities performed in manufacturing. Very often, the potential role of KISs 
in combining different forms of knowledge may help other sectors reach the efficiency 
frontier with clear evidence of knowledge spill-over effects (Camacho and Rodriguez 
2007). Hence, KIS sectors are also important for their function as carriers of knowledge, 
which influences the productivity of manufacturing sectors (Ciriaci and Palma 2016). 
In any case, overall KIS performance in the EU has been found to be largely responsible 
for the distance between the labour productivity growth of European economies with 
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respect to that of the US (Inklaar, Timmer, and Van Ark 2008, 142). The slow and 
declining labour productivity growth in services among EU countries, particularly in 
the Italian case, remains an unanswered question in the ongoing debate. In Italy, over 
the whole 1995-2016 period, productivity growth recorded a very low figure compared 
to their main competitors (Bugamelli and Lotti 2018, 20). Thus, our focus on market 
services may be particularly useful to identify the most efficient HR practices that can 
contribute to reversing these disappointing results. 
Starting from these considerations, this paper aims at analysing the relationship 
between CPRP and firms’ performance (labour and total factor productivity) for the 
whole Italian economy and different sectors, grouped by the degree of technological 
and knowledge intensity (Eurostat classification)ii. 
The Eurostat classification allows us to simplify and re-arrange two classes for business 
services (knowledge-intensive services, KISs, and less knowledge-intensive services, 
LKISs) and two classes for the manufacturing industry (high and medium-high 
technology; low and medium-low technology). By doing so, we can verify whether 
wage incentives reveal a distinctive and additional driver of productivity performance 
in Italian firms operating in KISs, which in turn have been identified as key industries 
for the creation of a dynamic knowledge-based economy. 
The data we use are obtained by merging statistical information from the Italian 
National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) Labour Cost Surveys (reference year 2012), the 
National Census for Industries and Services conducted in 2011, the National Social 
Insurance Agency (INPS, reference year 2012) and ISTAT-Chambers of Commerce 
balance sheets of firms (coverage from 2007 to 2014). 
In testing the role of CPRP on firm performance, we take into account the potential 
self-selection problem, as firms' adoption of collective performance-related pay may be 
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related to firm performance. The occurrence of such self-selection may generate biased 
estimates, and after OLS regressions, we perform additional estimates adopting the 
inverse probability weighting with a regression adjustment method (IPWRA) in the 
version suggested by Wooldridge (2010). Finally, by relaxing the selection-on-
observable hypothesis, we attempt to introduce valid instruments and run IV average 
treatment effect estimates (selection-on-unobservable). 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the related literature. 
Section 3 presents the Italian data that have been used and offers descriptive statistics. 
Section 4 illustrates the econometric strategy and section 5, the estimation results; 
section 6 concludes the paper. 
  
2. Literature review 
This section concentrates on reviewing literature that supports our research question, 
that is, studying different impacts of CPRP on the efficiency indicators of firms across 
sectors, paying specific attention to those industries where innovation processes rely on 
cooperative behaviour and knowledge sharing, such as KISs. Finally, we debate how 
firms’ performance is measured in studies dealing with CPRP and the economic 
outcomes. 
2.1 Studies on performance-related pay 
Studies focusing on the role of incentive pay schemes have documented significant 
heterogeneities within and across countries (Bryson et al. 2013). However, the different 
views of leading economistsiii who have significantly contributed to compensation 
research by developing theory and conducting empirical studies, clearly show that the 
link between wage incentives and knowledge management strategy remains an 
underdeveloped issue (Gibbs 2016). Some economists explicitly admit that little is 
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known regarding organizational structures, innovation processes and social networks 
within the firm, which may be different across industries (see in particular Gibbs 2016, 
18). 
To date, to explain incentive heterogeneities, some authors have investigated the 
adoption of compensation schemes implemented in isolation or as part of bundles of 
complementary HRM practices (Milgrom and Roberts 1995; Blasi et al. 2016). Other 
authors have analysed individual versus collective incentive payments (Kruse et al. 
2010). There is a widely held opinion that collective wage bonuses linking pay to 
performance, such as CPRP, constitute a commitment device to align worker and firm 
objectives and encourage collaborative relationships among employees (see, among the 
other reviews, Weitzman and Kruse,1990; OECD 1995; Bryson et al. 2013). In 
particular, it has been posited that collective wage incentives are assumed to have 
beneficial effects on productivity through three distinct channels: ‘(1) increasing 
worker effort; (2) increasing the skills of the workforce; and/or (3) increasing the flow 
of information within the organization’ (Kruse, 1992, 24). However, collective bonuses 
are not exempt from potential drawbacks (Ben-Ner and Jones 1995). The very fact that 
they are collective may encourage employees to shirk and free-ride on the efforts of 
others, causing underperforming results in terms of firm productivityiv. 
Furthermore, individual payment-by-result might play a primary role in selection, 
hiring and retention because the enterprise can use these schemes to attract high-ability 
workers and those that are particularly optimistic about the firm’s prospects; hence, 
these schemes reduce attrition among the most productive employees (Lazear 1999). 
However, as discussed by Bryson and Freeman (2010, 205), while group payments 
encourage employees to work cooperatively, individual payment for performance can 
induce some employees to sabotage the output of others, especially if that might 
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increase their probability of a promotion. Bryson and Freeman (2010) suggest that both 
types of incentives (collective and individual) may be useful and that their 
complementary usage is needed for maximizing output. On the one hand, teamwork 
and group-based incentive payments are relevant when the skills of a single employee 
enhance those of co-workers within the team (Lazear and Shaw 2007). It can be added 
that creating a social climate of cooperation is strategical for knowledge-intensive 
firms, where employees might see their competences and tacit knowledge as sources of 
job security and power and thereby be reluctant to share their knowledge with co-
workers (Davenport and Prusak 1998). On the other hand, individual pay for 
performance may provide a tool to combat the temptation to free-ride on the group and 
thus can complement collective incentive payments. These collective and individual 
HRM practices can be combined and could then increase firm performance more than 
either would if adopted independently (Lazaear and Shaw 2007). As empirically found 
by Pearsall et al. (2010), hybrid rewards (that combine team and individual schemes) 
lead to higher levels of performance, and these effects are due both to improvements in 
information allocation and reductions in social loafing, defined as the reduction in effort 
and motivation that tends to occur when individuals work collectively. 
However, the actual diffusion in the Italian economy of individual bonuses linked to 
performance is rather limited. Studies based on statistical sources alternative to those 
used in this empirical analysis clearly show only a small incidence of these individual 
premiums (Damiani and Ricci 2014). This evidence may be partly explained by the 
high union density rates recorded in the Italian economy, which has recorded a slower 
and more contained downward trend than elsewhere and is still one of the highest rates 
in the world (Leonardi and Pedersini 2018). Indeed, the influence of worker 
organizations usually supports inclusiveness and solidarity clauses in collective 
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agreements and the achievement of improvements in economic conditions on a broad 
front, rather than the development of incentives to reward individual skills and high-
level jobs. Additionally, the database we use offers information that indirectly confirms 
the limited incidence of individual incentives, as can be seen below (section 3.2). 
For the reasons above, in our analysis, we try to ascertain only the peculiar role of 
collective incentive pay (CPRP) in firms operating across different sectors. 
Especially in those sectors such as KISs, where knowledge, rather than physical or 
financial capital, is the most important input of firms, one can expect that collective 
incentives activate information sharing among co-workers and may also be directed to 
support the knowledge creation process. 
 
2.2 Performance-related pay in knowledge-intensive sectors 
Recent reviews of the strategic HRM literature (see Liu, Gong and Huang 2017) 
indicate that a fruitful area for research is to adopt a contingency approach to explore 
when HRM practices function more or less effectively (Jackson et al. 2014; Liu, Gong 
and Huang 2017). The contingency approach has seen limited use to verify how 
performance practices are affected by structural variables such as technology and 
market context, which typify the different sectors (Datta, Guthrie, and Wright 2005; 
Conray et al. 2015). 
Some industry characteristics could explain why workers’ capabilities may have a 
greater impact in KIS than in manufacturing sectors. 
First, management and economic studies show that the relative importance of HRM 
practices, such as commitment-based pay, is influenced by industry capital intensity 
(Datta, Guthrie, and Wright 2005). Indeed, although capital-intensive sectors may 
record high employee skill levels and higher wages, capital intensity often creates 
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strategic rigidity because fixed costs are high, emphasis is on asset management and 
cost control, and deviations from past practices are very expensive (Datta and 
Rajagopalan 1998). Capital-intensive firms are more focused on the degree of 
automation of the production technology and the related task structure, which greatly 
constrain employee performance (Terpstra and Rozell 1993, 43). By contrast, ‘the 
human element becomes more integral to the production process as capital intensity 
decreases’ (Datta, Guthrie, and Wright 2005 137). This is the distinctive aspect of KISs, 
where the human factor and intellectual capital play a central role. The same criterion 
of classification adopted by Eurostat reflects this point because a service activity is 
classified as knowledge intensive if persons achieving a tertiary education represent 
more than 33% of the total employment in that activity (European Commission 2012). 
Thus, the relevance of ‘filling knowledge gaps’ instead of ‘job filling’ (Brelade and 
Harman 2000) is a typical trait of KISs. Starbuck (1992) notes that knowledge should 
be understood not as a flow of information but as a stock of expertise, so that a firm 
should be considered knowledge-intensive when ‘exceptional and valuable expertise 
dominates commonplace knowledge’ (Starbuck 1992, 716). 
Second, commitment-based rewards are less beneficial for manufacturing line 
employees than for knowledge workers, as argued by Collins and Smith (2006). Some 
positive effects may be related to the value-creating potential of high skills, as well as 
the uniqueness of these skills to a particular firm (Lepak and Snell 1999, 35; Collins 
and Smith 2006). Thus, we expect that CPRP may be more beneficial for sectors where 
knowledge workers represent the vast majority of the workforce, such as KISs. This is 
particularly true in the Italian institutional setting, where most firms pay collective 
incentives at the firm or establishment level and lack the ability to differentiate 
incentives for line and knowledge workers. 
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Third, innovation and capabilities in services are different from innovation in 
manufacturing (Hipp and Grupp 2005). In KISs, the peculiar core competences of 
employees reside in their ability to combine codified scientific and technical knowledge 
with tacit knowledge based on previous experience (Gotsch and Hipp 2012). Especially 
in some KIS subsectors (computer and software consulting, legal and technical 
services, advertising, research and development)v, innovation is not generated by single 
special departments but emerges during daily experiences and in cooperation with 
clients; furthermore, it is not protected by patents nor is it acquired through formal R&D 
investment. Thus, in KISs, compared to the technologically oriented processes of 
manufacturing, service innovations are intangible in nature, and the knowledge 
supporting them is distributed among multiple skill sets and is not easily programmable. 
In addition, knowledge sharing and cumulative learning arising from relationships 
among users and suppliers have a central concern (European Commission 2012). 
In summary, a lower industry capital intensity, a higher percentage of knowledge 
workers, and the peculiar traits of innovation and capabilities are all moderating factors 
likely influencing a specific relationship between collective wage incentives and 
economic performance in KISs. 
Concerning collective versus individual wage incentives, note that knowledge and 
expertise are sources of power that may be limited by disclosure; thus, the lack of 
motivation to transfer knowledge to colleagues is a serious concern, and well-designed 
management systems must remedy this reluctance to share expertise, particularly in 
cases of tacit knowledge, whose propagation calls for socialization and apprenticeship 
(Srivastava et al. 2006). Reward schemes, which are contingent on firm outcomes that 
require knowledge sharing to be obtained, increase workers’ willingness to share 
knowledge and mitigate uncooperative attitudes. 
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However, the OECD report also highlights that specific activities in KISs require not 
only team work but also the efforts of individual workers to update their knowledge 
and individual learning to develop solutions for specific clients (OECD 2006). 
In addition, innovation is a function of both individual and group creativity, and 
knowledge is a key component of creativity (Amabile 1996). Thus far, only a few 
empirical studies have examined how knowledge affects the individual generation of 
new and useful ideas in the workplace, as observed in the extensive survey of Anderson, 
Potočnik, and Zhou (2014). Furthermore, the role of rewards in facilitating or hindering 
creativity remains an unsolved puzzle because the impact of individual rewards on 
creative behaviour may be mixed (Anderson, Potočnik, and Zhou 2014). For instance, 
Deci and Ryan (1985) argue that contingent base rewards may be viewed as an attempt 
to control individual behaviour that lessens innovative attitudes. Conversely, 
Einseberger et al. (2009) find that contingent rewards reveal the desire of givers to 
obtain collaboration from their subordinates and thus make cooperation easier between 
the potential recipient and the reward givers. 
All these considerations signal that the joint analysis of individual and collective 
bonuses would be the preferred option (Anderson, Potočnik, and Zhou 2014). 
Unfortunately, as stated above and explained in more depth in section 3.1, the SICA-
LCS survey we use does not provide data on enterprises that adopt individual 
incentives. Future research, also based on other country studies, might investigate the 
potential complementarities of different incentives at the individual and team levels. 
 
2.3 Incentive pay and firm performance 
In our analysis, we examine the role of wage incentives on efficiency. Literature on 
outcomes of the incentive pay system often examines indicators of profitability and 
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efficiency (Park and Kruse 2014; Bryson et al. 2013). Indeed, the latter may also be 
conditioned by a number of organizational factors (Park and Kruse 2014) that we 
cannot control for in our econometric analysis. Furthermore, it is worth noting that in 
the Italian case, productivity is the main factor holding back long-term economic 
growth; hence, measures to promote performance-based rewards are a relevant issue in 
the long-debated slowing of the growth rates of the Italian economy (Bugamelli and 
Lotti 2018). 
According to Syverson (2011), the efficiency indicators primarily used among scholars 
are labour productivity (LP) and total factor productivity (TFP). As is well known, the 
former is a measure of single factor productivity affected by the intensity of use of 
excluded inputs (capital in primis). Even when a control for capital intensity is 
introduced, the endogeneity between capital and value added remains a major concern. 
TFP solves these problems and better reflects technological change, the quality of 
inputs, and the management and organizational capabilities of firms. Regardless, using 
TFP as a measure of technical efficiency is not completely trouble-free. Some authors 
criticize TFP’s high sensitivity to the assumptions concerning the underlying 
production function (Bottazzi et al. 2010). Others argue that TFP measures not only 
technological change, but also market power if we are not able to control for output 
price heterogeneity across firms (De Loecker and Goldberg 2014; Bugamelli and Lotti 
2018). 
Given this even distribution of pros and cons between LP and TFP, in this study, we 
maintain both measures of productivity. Overall, we expect that CPRP positively 
affects LP. This evidence would also provide us feedback on the reliability of the 
magnitude of the CPRP impact, as we can compare this result with those from other 
studies on Italy (Bryson et al. 2013; Lucifora and Origo 2015), which mainly used LP 
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as the only outcome variable. In addition, we expect a positive influence of CPRP on 
TFP, which, among other things, is also a proxy for organizational capabilities and 
quality of labour. Whether collective incentive pay particularly boosted TFP in KISs 
could indicate whether collective bonuses spur motivation and knowledge sharing in 
contexts where team- and project-based working matter. 
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
3.1 Data  
As mentioned in the introduction and further explained in the section dedicated to the 
econometric strategy, we attempted to solve the self-selection problem in our cross-
section sample by enlarging as much as possible the set of control variables concerning 
the firm’s characteristics to make plausible the assumption of selection on observables. 
This led us to combine four different data sources that ISTAT made available for our 
analysis: i) Labour Cost Survey (LCS); ii) National Social Insurance Agency (INPS); 
iii) National Census for Industries and Services (NCIS) and iv) firms’ balance sheet.  
As regards the explanatory variables, our empirical analysis is mainly based on 
information obtained by LCS that was conducted by ISTAT in 2012 on a representative 
sample of firms with more than ten employees operating in the private non-agricultural 
sector. The information used in this paper is gathered from the separate section SICA 
(Sistema Informativo sulla Contrattazione Aziendale) of the ISTAT LCS, see 
Cardinaleschi (2013). The SICA-LCS survey collects data about the various 
components of labour costs determined at different levels of the wage bargaining.  
Note that the Italian institutional wage setting is characterized by a two-tier bargaining 
regime. In this regime, first-level wage contracts at the sectoral level are intended to 
guarantee the purchasing power of wages and thus set wage increases linked to the 
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target inflation rate; the second level of bargaining, at the firm level, distributes wage 
premiums, which may be of a fixed amount or linked to productivity or profit results.  
Concerning the performance-related pay schemes, SICA-LCS data mainly refer to 
variable bonuses paid to all employees. These schemes are distinct from more 
traditional fixed bonuses, which are offered independently from firm results. Regarding 
the variable collective bonuses, the SICA-LCS survey distinguishes among schemes 
determined in reference to a variety of economic indicators of company performance, 
such as the achievement of profit, productivity of teams, and quality targets. This 
information should permit us to verify the peculiarities of risk sharing participatory 
schemes (linked to profit targets) and incentive schemes (linked to productivity and 
quality indicators). Thus, we obtain five typologies of targets: i) profitability, such as 
gross operating margins, and other budgetary measures; ii) team productivity, which 
includes basically any kind of measures of technical efficiency and labour productivity 
obtained at the team and establishment levels; iii) quality, a group of indicators that 
includes the number of defective outputs, the percentage of discarded products and 
customer complaints; iv) attendance, which refers to the presence of workers and 
permits to monitor and evaluate absenteeism; and v) other, that is a residual group. Of 
course, collective bonuses are distributed when some of these targets are achieved. 
Furthermore, for firms that achieve these targets, the SICA-LCS survey asks about the 
criteria adopted to distribute bonuses to their workforce. Again, five different categories 
of criteria are available: i) attendance, ii) job titlesvi, iii) individual acquisition of 
competencies and skills, iv) acquisition of relational competencies, implementation of 
team production processes and efforts to support customer relations; and v) compliance 
with functional flexibility (working time changes, multi-tasking or task changes)vii. 
However, notice that, in our econometric analysis, we cannot consider all this detailed 
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information because the limited number of observations for each variety of schemes 
does not permit us to obtain reliable distinct estimates for every type of incentive. 
Therefore, we use this detailed information only in descriptive statistics, which, 
regardless, help us to corroborate the econometric results.  
In any case, the SICA-LCS section provides information about the adoption of firm-
level bargaining, and each firm is asked whether a CPRP scheme has been adoptedviii. 
Therefore, our key explanatory variable is a dummy variable indicating the existence 
or not of a CPRP scheme of some kind. To establish a sufficient time lag and to alleviate 
endogeneity problems among this key regressor and the outcome variables, we only 
considered firms for which CPRP was introduced before 2012 and excluded those 
implementing this scheme as new scheme in 2012. Additional information on the 
payment of the so-called ‘guaranteed element of remuneration’ (Elemento di Garanzia 
Retributivo), which is a fixed bonus established at the first-level of bargaining, is also 
gathered by SICA-LCS and has been included in the analysis as control. From the same 
survey, we draw information on workforce characteristics and labour relations (fixed-
term and part-time contracts, trained employees, composition by gender, presence of 
unions) and firm characteristics (size classes in terms of employees, industry and 
geographical location).  
According to the literature (Belot et al. 2007), job tenure could influence the firm 
performance, hence we resort to INPS to obtain this information, which refers to 2012. 
Other useful aspects of firm business strategy (product and process innovation, export 
orientation and multinational status) are obtained by statistical data collected by the 
National Italian Census for Industries and Services for the end of 2011. 
Eventually, the balance sheet information (from 2007 to 2014 in our case) that ISTAT 
draws from the Chamber of Commerce archives allow us to define two efficiency 
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indicators. These two variables have been obtained as averages over the years 2013 and 
2014 to insert a reasonable time interval between CPRP (already implemented before 
2012) and the firm performances. These two indicators are a standard labour 
productivity measure (the ratio of value added to employment), and the TFP, that we 
estimated with the method explained in section 4. Only for this derived variable (TFP), 
inputs and outputs of the firm-level production function over the whole available 2007-
2014 period have been taken into account, then we average residuals over 2013-2014. 
From the Chamber of Commerce archives, we also gather information to construct a 
profitability indicator, that is the return on sales (ROS)ix. In more details, we take the 
average of ROS over the 2007-2010 period and use this indicator of past profitability 
(ROS_2007-2010) as an instrument, among others, to test strong endogeneity and 
selection on unobservables for our key explanatory variable, that is CPRP (see section 
4). On the one hand, the past profitability is considered in literature as a proxy of the 
‘ability to pay’ of firms, the latter being strongly associated with the implementation of 
HRM practices and incentive pay systems (Park and Kruse 2014). On the other hand, 
past profitability is not always a driver of efficiency, especially across Italian firms, as 
pointed out by Bottazzi et al. (2010). Based on these considerations, we assume that 
ROS_2007-2010 may be an instrument for CPRP because it influences the probability 
that firms introduce CPRP schemes but at the same time does not necessarily influence 
the efficiency indicators.  
The statistical classification of economic activities is obtained by applying the NACE 
rev.2 classification at two digits, and sectors are grouped, following Eurostat, into 
distinct classes: two classes for the manufacturing industry (high- and medium high-
technology, low and medium low-technology)x; two classes for services (knowledge-
intensive services, KISs, and less knowledge-intensive services, LKISs) and a residual 
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group that includes Mining and Quarrying, Electricity and Gas, Water Supply and 
Construction.  
By combining all four datasets, we obtain a sample of 3,806 firms. This sample is 
restricted, compared to the maximum number of observations available for only the 
SICA-LCS dataset (more than 6,000 firms). This important reduction in the sample size 
is the price we accepted to pay to increase the number and quality of observable firms’ 
characteristics, which makes more plausible the implementation of a treatment effect 
method based on selection on observables. 
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics of our sample are reported in Table 1. The first column shows the 
main characteristics for the whole economy, whereas the other columns report the 
results for the distinct groups of industries. Note that in our sample, the highest share 
of firms is recorded in L&M_Tech sectors (28%) and LKISs (26%), summing to more 
than fifty% of the whole sample (54%). A total of 23% of firms are in KISs, while the 
lowest share is found in H&M_Tech, with only approximately 13%. 
As expected, the most advanced sectors, H&M_Tech and KISs, although less 
represented, show the highest values for labour productivity and very high values for 
TFPxi. In particular, for both indicators, the highest values are recorded for H&M_Tech 
(above the average of the whole economy), followed by those for KISs. We also note 
the low percentages of exporting firms in KISs and LKISs (28.23% and 27.18%, 
respectively), which are below the higher values recorded in the other sectors (85.28% 
in H&M_Tech and 78.46% in L&M_Tech)xii. 
As expected, both service industries have a lower degree of capital intensity than does 
manufacturing, as shown by the amount of capital per unit of work (measured by the 
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ratio of capital to employees). However, a significant differential between the two 
groups is noteworthy. Indeed, KISs, notwithstanding a low value of capital to labour, 
record higher values for both efficiency indicators, likely reaching this superior 
efficiency performance through the accumulation of human and intellectual capital. 
In terms of the enterprise dimension, we observe that KISs are predominantly 
characterized by small firms, more than manufacturing and more than LKISs. In 
particular, KISs show the highest incidence of firms with fewer than 50 employees, as 
the share of firms in the class with 10-49 employees is 55.64% of the whole sector, in 
comparison to only one-third of the LKISs. The small size of firms operating in KISs 
is also associated with the lowest values of unionization (32.78%), well below the 
figures found in the other sectors. Also remarkable, KISs hold the highest percentage 
of fixed-term contracts (20.66%), the lowest mean values for job tenure (7.56 years), 
and the highest share of women (approximately half of their workforce). Furthermore, 
firms operating in KISs are not particularly active in terms of outlays for technological 
innovation projects, as firms involved in product and process innovation record 
percentages of 41.37% and 31.23%, well below the values found in both manufacturing 
industries. In contrast, the highest incidence of innovation is registered in H&M_Tech, 
where 74.19% and 58.32% of firms are involved in product and process innovation, 
respectively. However, it is remarkable that firms operating in KISs offer more 
opportunities to their employees in terms of training, as one-third of them conduct 
training programmes for more than 50% of their employees. The percentage of firms 
performing training programmes with high coverage is much lower in the L&M_Tech 
(19.33%) and H&M_Tech sectors (16.06%). 
Interestingly, for our analysis, the key variable CPRP, which captures the adoption of 
collective wage incentives, shows a limited diffusion in KISs and LKISs, where these 
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schemes are adopted only by 6.93% and 6.16% of firms, respectively. In contrast, in 
manufacturing, the incidence of CPRP is higher (13.77% and 11.44%, in H&M_Tech 
and L&M_Tech, respectively). 
Additional information to obtain a thorough picture of collective bonuses is reported in 
Figure 1, where we observe the distributions of firms adopting CPRP according to 
different targets. First, this figure shows that profit targets are the most common 
indicators across sectors, as they are used by more than 50% of firms paying collective 
bonuses. Concerning the quality target, a clear divergence emerges between the 
manufacturing and service sectors. For manufacturing (H&M_Tech and L&M_Tech 
industries), the quality indicator is more important; indeed, it is the most important 
indicator in L&M_Tech sectors. This finding is easily explained because in 
manufacturing, a key objective is to reduce defects and waste. Conversely, in the 
tertiary sector, the low incidence of quality targets can be explained by a number of 
obstacles stemming from intangibility, the absence service quality standards and the 
intrinsic difficulties in ascertaining their suitability prior to engaging with them (OECD 
2006). Particularly in KISs, the importance assigned to project-based work explains 
why the second most important target is the productivity improvement of teams, 
considering that 40% of firms adopting CPRP choose this objective. Among the criteria 
adopted to distribute wage premiums (see Figure 2), we find in KISs, a sector 
characterized by high-skilled employees and labour-intensive processes, that job titles 
have a more meaningful role, while attendance has a minor incidence (see Figure 2). In 
addition, it is remarkable that in KISs, the acquisition of relational competencies and 
improvement of team capabilities are much more important than they are in high- and 
medium-high-tech sectors (14% vs 7% of firms, respectively). This finding confirms 
the necessity in KISs of favouring knowledge sharing and interactive processes among 
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organizations with multiple skill sets. In LKISs, functional flexibility (e.g., the rotation 
of jobs and tasks, shifts and flexibility in working time) is particularly relevant. The 
opposite result is evident for KISs, a sector where employee abilities are more complex, 
more difficult to acquire and involve more job autonomy, thus making a high degree of 
firm internal functional flexibility less efficient. In sum, this preliminary evidence 
signals the potential importance of sectoral characterization of incentive pay systems. 
We will test this hypothesis below. 
TABLE 1, HERE 
FIGURES 1 AND 2, HERE 
4. Econometric method 
As we mentioned above, we calculated dependent variables (i.e., labour productivity 
and TFP) as an average for the years 2013 and 2014. This ensures that the information 
on CPRP (reference year 2012) is sufficiently lagged with respect to firm economic and 
financial performance. TFP is an estimated variable obtained with a two-step estimation 
procedure similar to that applied by Black and Lynch (2001). Specifically, in this case, 
we used longitudinal data concerning the balance sheets of the firms of interest for the 
period 2007-2014 and estimated a Cobb-Douglas production function by implementing 
the GMM_SYS estimator (see Table A.1 in the Appendix). Then, we calculated the 
average residuals for each firm only for the years 2013 and 2014. The variable TFP 
could be a more refined index of productivity, especially if value added, capital and 
labour are simultaneously chosen or if there are measurement errors for the proxy of 
the capital stock (Black and Lynch 2001). 
After this preliminary estimation, we perform an OLS regression on our cross-section 




(1) 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐹𝑃 𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∙ 𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑃𝑖 +  𝜗 ∙ 𝑭𝑖 + 𝜇𝑠 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖      
 
where lnTFP𝑖 is the log of the TFP at the firm level (i=1, …3,806), and CPRP represents 
our key dummy variable indicating the presence of a collective performance-related 
pay scheme. The vector Fi denotes controls for workforce characteristics (shares of 
temporary and part-time contracts, shares of women, share of firms that trained more 
than 50% of their employees, average job tenure) and for firm characteristics (size of 
classes, process and product innovations, export propensity, multinational enterprises). 
Moreover, Fi also includes dummies for institutional factors that vary across firms and 
could affect performance, such as the presence of unions and fixed bonuses established 
at the sectoral level of the wage bargaining (the so-called ‘Elemento di Garanzia 
Retributivo’, EGR). The parameter 𝜇𝑠  denotes sector dummies, 𝛾𝑗  denotes regional 
(NUTS1_level) dummies, and 𝜀𝑖     is the error term capturing the idiosyncratic 
component of TFP. 
As we discussed in section 2.4, TFP could be sensitive to the assumptions underlying 
the production function specification. In addition, we need terms of comparison with 
other studies focused on Italy to know if the CPRP impact on efficiency lies in reliable 
ranges. Because these studies are based on labour productivity, we also maintain the 
labour productivity equation as corroborating analysis: 
 





+  𝜗 ∙ 𝑭𝑖 + 𝜇𝑠 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖      
 
where 𝐿𝑃𝑖 now represents labour productivity, and the number of observations is again 






which is the (log of) physical capital per employee, to consider heterogeneity in capital 
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intensity across firms. All other terms of equation 2 are exactly those we previously 
discussed for equation 1. 
Since investigating different effects of CPRP across sectors is one of the main interests 
of the study, we replicate all estimates above for the industries grouped according 
Technological or Knowledge intensity. This means that we re-run equations 1 and 2 for 
High- and Medium-High-Tech (H&M_tech), Low- and Medium-Low-Tech 
(L&M_tech) sectors of manufacturing; Knowledge-Intensive (KISs) and Less-
Knowledge-Intensive (LKISs) service sectors and a residual group named Other 
(Mining and Quarrying, Electricity and Gas, Water Supply and Construction). 
There is currently large consensus in the econometric literature that a simple OLS 
regression does not always work well (Angrist and Pischke 2009; Wooldridge 2010; 
Imbens 2014). If we observe the CPRP adoption from the point of view of the treatment 
effect literature, it is plausible to wonder if firms implementing this incentive pay 
scheme would have performed well anyway. For example, if the covariate distributions 
differ substantially by treatment status and CPRP firms are also the larger ones or more 
frequently are multinational firms, it means that the treatment variable (CPRP) is not 
independent from our outcome variables, which are different indicators of firm 
performance. Therefore, our key OLS coefficient 𝛽 could be upward biased. This self-
selection problem is particularly severe in cross-sectional samples because we are not 
able to control for firm unobserved heterogeneity by implementing fixed effects 
estimation. 
For this reason, we established a counterfactual setting and attempted to solve the self-
selection problem by adopting a treatment effect approach that relies on i) ignorability 
(or unconfoundedness) and ii) overlap assumptions (Wooldridge 2010; Imbens 2014). 
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If we set y0 a generic outcome variable (TFP or LP), we can express the ignorability 
assumption as the following: 
(3)   E(y0| F, CPRP) = E(y0| F) and E(y1| F, CPRP) = E(y1| F) 
where y0 is the performance that the firm would have if it did not adopt CPRP and y1 is 
the performance that it shows if it did; thus, CPRP is now our treatment and F the set 
of covariates reported above. The idea underlying this assumption is that if we can 
observe enough information contained in F that determines treatment, then y0 and y1 
might be mean independent of CPRP, conditional on F. In other words, even though 
(y0, y1) and CPRP might be correlated, they are uncorrelated once we partial out F. 
The overlap assumption: 
(4)  0<P(CPRP=1 | F)<1 
means that for any setting of covariates in the assumed population, there is a chance of 
seeing units in both the control and treatment groups.  
Based on these crucial assumptions, we used an IPWRA approach that combines two 
different methods to correct the self-selection bias and identify the average treatment 
effects of treated (CPRP_ATET).   
The regression adjustment (RA) uses a two-step approach to estimate the average 
treatment effects: 
1. In the first step, RA fits separate regression models of the outcome on a set of 
covariates for each treatment level (firms adopting or not adopting CPRP). These 
regressions predict potential outcomes adjusted for covariates. For example, for each 
CPRP firm (treated units), the Potential Outcome (POM) calculates the counterfactual 
performance, i.e., the TFP or LP, the firm would achieve if it did not adopt CPRP. This 
is possible because for every treated unit, we hopefully have some units in the control 




2. In the second step, RA computes the averages of the predicted outcomes for each 
subject and treatment level. These averages reflect the potential outcome means 
(POMs). The differences of these averages provide estimates of the average treatment 
effects (ATEs). In our case, we calculated the only average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATETs). Thus, the POM is the average of the counterfactual performance 
predicted for firms adopting CPRP, i.e., the TFP or LP it would achieve if it did not 
adopt CPRP. 
Inverse Probability Weighting estimators (IPW) use weighted averages of the observed 
outcome variable to estimate means of the potential outcomes. The weights account for 
the missing data inherent in the potential-outcome framework. Each weight is the 
inverse of the estimated probability that an individual receives a treatment level. 
Outcomes of individuals who receive a likely treatment get a weight close to one. 
Outcomes of individuals who receive an unlikely treatment get a weight larger than 
one, potentially much larger. 
IPW estimators model the probability of treatment without any assumptions about the 
functional form for the outcome model. In contrast, RA estimators model the outcome 
without any assumptions about the functional form for the probability of the treatment 
model. 
According to Wooldridge (2010), we can combine RA and IPW to achieve some 
robustness to misspecification of the parametric models. The resulting estimator is said 
to be doubly robust, as it only requires either the conditional mean model or the 
propensity score model to be correctly specified but not both. 
IPWRA estimators use the inverse of the estimated treatment-probability weights to 
estimate missing-data-corrected regression coefficients that are subsequently used to 
compute the POMs. In other terms, IPWRA has a specific two-step procedure: in the 
24 
 
first step, the probability of treatment (CPRP, in our case) is estimated by means of the 
propensity score, and in the second step, mean conditional models (RA) are adopted 
using the weights given by the inverse of the probability of treatment.  
A number of studies adopt the IPWRA method. Meara et al. (2017) used this approach 
to study the gender wage gap in the US when other control variables cannot be 
considered exogenous, such as part-time labour status and education. By means of 
IPWRA, it is possible to control for gender, part-time contract and education, which 
are simultaneously correlated with the women wage levels. As stated above, we have 
similar problems in observing the impact of CPRP on firm performance and controlling, 
among other factors, by firm size and multinational enterprises (MNE). Indeed, in our 
case, there is a high probability that the firm size and the MNE character influence the 
treatment (CPRP) and simultaneously determine the firm performances. A thorough 
discussion of the IPWRA method is offered by Wooldridge (2010) and another 
interesting application is provided by Frölich et al. (2017), who test the efficacy of 
active labour market programmes in Switzerland. Cerulli (2015) discusses the 
application of IPWRA in the evaluation of socio-economic programmes and R&D 
policies. 
However, the IPWRA estimator is consistent if the ignorability assumption holds, and 
self-selection is based on observables. In contrast, whether self-selection is based on 
certain unobservable factors, we need an instrumental variable method to solve the 
problem. For example, if the implementation of CPRP also depends on manager 
capabilities, and this information is not adequately captured by the control variables we 
use (firm size, multinational enterprise, export or innovation capabilities), the treatment 
is correlated with the error term such that differently from expression 3, we have 
(4)  𝐸(𝜀𝑖,0|𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑃𝑖) ≠ 0 and 𝐸(𝜀𝑖,1|𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑃𝑖) ≠ 0 
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 where i is the firm-level observation, and 0,1 are treatment and non-treatment status, 
respectively. 
Although finding valid instruments in our case is not a simple task, we attempted to 
detect selection on unobservables in our data as a further robustness check. Thus, we 
re-estimated ATET using an instrumental variable approach and then tested the 
presence of strong endogeneity reported in the expression (4). Again, according to 
Wooldridge (2010), we used a control-function estimator based on the following 
statements: 
(5) 𝐸(𝜀𝑖,𝑗|𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑃𝑖) = 𝐸(𝜀𝑖,𝑗| 𝐸(𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑃𝑖|𝒛𝑖) + 𝜐𝑖) = 𝐸(𝜀𝑖,𝑗  | 𝜐𝑖)  = 𝜉𝜐𝑖 
where i are firm-level observations; j =0,1 the treatment status; 𝒛 is a matrix containing 
both included (control variables previously used in equations 1 and 2) and excluded 
instrument (past profitability) that we discussed in section 3.1xiii; 𝜐 is the unobserved 
component. Expression 5 tells us that we can isolate the unobserved component by 
fitting a first step probit regression of CPRP on 𝒛 to obtain 𝜐 as difference between 
CPRP and 𝐸(𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑃𝑖|𝒛𝑖). In the second step, we add the residuals 𝜐 to the equations 1 
and 2 estimated with the regression adjusted method. This means that, for each 
equation, we can estimate and test the correlations between unobservables and the error 
term reported in expression 4, for both outcome model 0 (CPRP=0) and outcome model 
1 (CPRP=1). In testing the joint significance of these two correlations, we perform an 
endogeneity test that informs us about the necessity of using the IV treatment effect 
method. If we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no correlation between CPRP and 
error term, IPWRA is the appropriate estimator to use (Wooldridge 2010). 
 
5. Estimation results 
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Before discussing the regression results, we present a correlation matrix of all variables 
used in the empirical analysis. The high number of covariates, we use to meet the 
ignorability assumption discussed above and to make a self-selection problem only 
based on observables plausible, raises a concern of redundant explanatory variables and 
potential multicollinearity in the estimates. Indeed, Table 2 shows very low pairwise 
correlations among the majority of cells referring to covariates. In only a few and 
expected cases do we find associations that are not negligible, that is, correlation 
between shares of part-time workers and women, share of fixed-term workers and 
average tenure, and process and product innovations. Regardless, this preliminary 
evidence leads us to perform a multicollinearity test after OLS regressions to exclude 
any possible ambiguity around this aspect. 
TABLE 2, HERE 
5.1 OLS estimates 
Table 3 presents OLS estimates for the whole economy. These results are obtained by 
controlling for firm characteristics (capital intensity, size, geographical location, 
innovation and internationalization strategies) and other characteristics that concern 
labour relations and the workforce (unionization, fixed bonuses, percentages of fixed-
term and part-time contracts, composition by gender, job tenure, training). This high 
number of covariates does not create multicollinearity problems, as the variance 
inflation factors test signals (see Table A.2 in the Appendix)xiv. 
TABLE 3, HERE 
Our results show that the regression coefficients associated with the dummy variable 
CPRP are significant at the 1% level for TFP and labour productivity. These estimates 
suggest that the adoption of collective wage incentives (CPRP=1) is associated with an 
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increase in TFP of 4.5% and with an even greater increase in labour productivity of 
7.5%. 
As expected, innovation and foreign competition appear to be drivers of TFP and labour 
productivity, although at different significance levels (Melitz 2003). The results for 
workforce characteristics are more articulated. The adoption of fixed-term contracts is 
negatively and significantly associated with labour productivity, although not with 
TFP, whereas part-time contracts appear to exert negative effects on both efficiency 
indicators (TFP and labour productivity). This association could be related to a general 
lower commitment on the part of part-time workers, which starts to exert a negative 
influence on overall firm efficiency when the share of part-time workers on total 
employment increases. It is worth noting that other workforce, firm and institutional 
characteristics, such as tenure, training, unions and the use of fixed bonuses (EGR), 
appear in our specification as poor determinants of economic performance. 
Table 4 offers additional results for sector-specific estimates. To make the comparison 
easier, we report the previous results for the whole sample in the first column. The 
results obtained reveal heterogeneous findings. OLS estimates indicate that the CPRP 
coefficient is positive and significant (although only at the 10% level) in L&M_Tech 
for TFP estimates and in KISs and LKISs for labour productivity. 
Note that these results are all obtained after taking into account the whole set of control 
variables mentioned above (firms’ strategies and characteristics) and after including 
sector (2_digits NACEce Rev.2 sectors) and regional (NUTS1) dummies. 
From these preliminary results, we observe that no clear sectoral patterns emerge. In 
particular, in the descriptive statistics, we have observed a high percentage of firms 
implementing CPRP in the H&M_tech sectors; however, they do not appear to be the 
drivers of the overall positive and significant impact that this incentive pay scheme has 
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at the aggregate level for the whole set of Italian firms. Indeed, it is within the 
L&M_Tech and service sectors (both KISs and LKISs) that we find positive and 
significant associations of CRPP with the outcome variables. 
However, OLS estimates should be considered with caution and only as explorative 
investigations due to their potential biases relying on self-selection problems and the 
non-random assignment of CPRP. This problem is taken into account by adopting 
inverse probability weighting with regression adjustment (IPWRA). 
TABLE 4, HERE 
5.2 Inverse probability weighting with regression adjustment estimates 
As discussed in section 4, the IPWRA method works within a counterfactual framework 
in which we estimate the gap between the average performances of firms adopting 
CPRP and the average performance the same firms would have achieved by not 
adopting CPRP (that is, the average treatment effect on the treated CPRP_ATET). In 
other words, we solve the missing data problem of firms for which we only observe one 
condition (adopting CPRP) by estimating their counterfactual (POMs, 
CPRP_Pot_Outcomes), which is the result obtained with no CPRP. By relying on the 
overlap assumption, we use the control group (CPRP=0) to estimate the 
CPRP_Pot_Outcomes for the treated group. 
Because IPWRA combines a parametric method (RA) with a propensity score method 
(inverse probability weighting, IPW), in the Appendix (Table A.3), we also report the 
probabilities of treatment (adoption of CPRP) we estimated in the first step. The first 
step results tell us that many covariates influence the probability of CPRP adoption and 
that they should be taken into account by means of inverse probability weighting. In 
particular, larger size, unions and training positively influence the probability of CPRP. 
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As already performed for Table 4, in the second step of IPWRA estimations (see Table 
5), we concentrate on the key results (CPRP_ATET and CPRP_Pot_Outcomes in this 
case) and omit all findings referring to covariatesxv. 
TABLE 5, HERE 
For the whole sample, IPWRA estimates of Table 5 confirm the previous OLS findings 
and suggest that our key explanatory variable CPRP shows a positive and significant 
impact at the 1% and 5% level of significance on both indicators of efficiency, TFP and 
labour productivity, respectively. More precisely, CPRP_ATET is 3.5% for TFP and 
6.2% for labour productivity. This means that if treated firms had not implemented 
CPRP schemes, their logTFP would be 0.073 (1.07 in levels) and their log labour 
productivity would be 11.007 (60,295 euros 2010, in levels) (as shown by the 
CPRP_Pot_Outcomes, reported in Table 5). Instead, by implementing CPRP, Italian 
firms raised their log TFP by 3.5% and their labour productivity by 6.2%. These 
improvements are slightly lower than those reported by the OLS estimations (4.5% and 
7.5% for TFP and labour productivity, respectively) and confirm that a slight upward 
bias affects OLS results. The unbiased values we obtain with the IPWRA method show 
an order of magnitude close to those found in related international literature (see, for 
instance, Gielen et al. 2010; Kato et al. 2012). Particularly if we restrict the comparison 
to similar studies focusing on Italy, the overall positive impact of CPRP on labour 
productivity that we find with the IPWRA estimator (i.e., 6.2%) better approaches the 
5% impact that Lucifora and Origo (2015) found. 
The case of sector-specific estimates seems to confirm previous results but also reveals 
new significant heterogeneities. First, we have confirmation of a causal effect on TFP 
and labour productivity only for KIS industries. For the other sectors, no significant 
results are obtained. One rationale behind this result might be that collective wage 
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incentives, such as CPRP, fuel teamwork, interactive learning, and workers’ 
commitment to cooperation and thereby reveal a strategic role in developing and 
integrating knowledge and workers’ capabilities (Laursen and Mahnke 2001). 
According to the OECD (2006), the effective management of human resources in KISs 
is based on forming multi-disciplinary research teams that broaden their own 
knowledge base by selling solutions to other firms. For example, in the software 
industry, new product ideas are often obtained by engineering and marketing 
departments that must collaborate to interpret feedback originating from customers and 
to offer them suitable solutions. These solutions emerge from daily work in time-
restricted project groups and in contexts of high uncertainty that affect their final layout. 
In contrast, the multidimensional character of innovative activities is much less 
developed in H&M_Tech manufacturing, where sources of innovation reside within 
unique, specialized R&D departments, and innovation itself, despite the high 
uncertainty, is the outcome of specific research processes and technological trajectories 
(Gotsch and Hipp 2012). In addition, KISs are distinctly characterized by the substantial 
contribution of organizational change, much more so than manufacturing, as also found 
from the international input-output data of Peneder, Kaniovsk and Dachs (2003) and in 
studies by the European Commission (2012). All these reasons suggest that collective 
incentive payments could be more binding in KISs, where the need to favour personnel 
connections and to adequately establish collective problem-solving processes is more 
important. 
5.3 Robustness check 
As observed in section 4, we are not completely sure that correcting for selection on 
observables by means of the IPWRA estimator is sufficient. For example, if innate 
manager capabilities strongly affect CPRP implementation and are not adequately 
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captured by covariates such as firm size, multinational enterprise or innovation 
capabilities, the random assignment of CPRP is not restored when we use the IPWRA 
method. 
Therefore, we perform an ATET estimation using instrumental variables (IV_ATET) 
and test the joint significance of estimated correlations between unobservables and 
error terms in both potential-outcome models (CPRP=1 and CPRP=0) of equations 1 
and 2. 
As discussed in section 3.1, the set of excluded instruments includes a variable not used 
in the previous econometric analysis, that is, the past ability of the firm to pay (average 
ROS over the 2007-2010 period), and four currently used variables that can be 
considered instruments, as they proved to not be correlated with TFP or labour 
productivity (see Table 3), whereas they resulted in important determinants of CPRP 
(see Table A.3, in the Appendix). These four covariates, which are added to past 
profitability in the set of excluded instruments, are unions, tenure, training and fixed 
bonus (EGR)xvi. 
The results for the IV_ATET and endogeneity tests are reported in Table A.4 (in the 
Appendix). Nearly all coefficients of CPRP_IV_ATET, both in the whole sample and 
across sectors, are not significant because the standard errors are much higher than 
those obtained with the IPWRA estimator (see Table 5). The significance of the 
correlation between unobservables and the outcome models is very weak and only 
detected for the counterfactual model (outcome mod.0). The joint significance of the 
two correlations, that is, the endogeneity test (last row of Table A.4), tell us that we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the treatment and outcome unobservables are not 
correlated. According to Wooldridge (2010), if there is no selection on unobservables, 
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IPWRA remains a more reliable estimator due to its higher consistency and 
efficiencyxvii. 
6. Conclusions 
Focusing on a specific HRM practice represented by collective wage incentives, such 
as CPRP, we have found that this type of reward system is more efficacious in terms 
of TFP and labour productivity when adopted in KISs. 
The peculiarities of KISs call to the forefront the abilities of firms operating in these 
sectors to convert skills and knowledge held by their human capital into intellectual 
capital and expertise, for instance, by developing skills to match demand and finding 
specific solutions that provide value for their clients. These skills may be more easily 
obtained under a high degree of decentralization and the application of HRM practices 
that involve teamwork, the delegation of decision rights and performance-based 
payments. 
Our result is aligned with evidence offered by the OECD report (OECD 2006), which 
shows that in some KIS sectors, such as software services, cooperative relations 
between different departments of the same company (i.e., the engineering and 
marketing departments in the software computer case) are key factors in firm 
innovation and success. Furthermore, in services, innovation may be driven not so 
much by technology but, above all, as a response to customer needs, and when a firm 
learns from its customers, ‘it is likely that learning will be embedded in individuals 
within the firm’, as has been found in a number of sectoral KIS studies (see the OECD 
report 2006). In this case, managerial practices and incentives also play a strategic role 




The institutional peculiarities of the labour market matter for explaining the role of 
wage incentives on knowledge creation and sharing and, through these channels, on 
labour efficiency. The Italian economy is a notable case study because it is 
characterized by wage setting rules quite similar to those of many other European 
countries, where firm-level wage contracts supplement industry-level wage setting. 
However, in Italy, where there are no statutory minimum wages, wage setting is based 
on sector-wide agreements that set the ‘base wages’, whereas firm-level negotiations 
have a limited influence, especially in service sectors. A wider space for firm-level 
contracts and CPRP would benefit productivity growth and innovation. These 
agreements could be particularly valuable because the Italian service sectors, since 
2010, have displayed declining trends, especially in professional, scientific, and 
business technical support activities (Bugamelli and Lotti 2018). 
Finally, note that Italian institutional peculiarities have not permitted determination of 
whether group and individual bonuses may be used as complementary practices to 
induce knowledge sharing and the generation of new and useful ideas. Hence, it would 
be useful if more research could be conducted based on the experiences of other 
countries where firm-level agreements and hybrid wage incentives, such as individual 
and collective incentives, are more diffused. These contexts could allow recognition of 
individual creativity and verify the role of group and individual rewards and their 
importance in KISs. 
In more general terms, we can draw from this study some valuable lessons for policy 
and management choices. Peneder, Kaniovsk and Dachs (2003) document from 
international input-output data the rise of knowledge-based services as the most 
dynamic component and the new engine of growth. Indeed, as also recalled by the 
European Commission (2009, 19), KISs play a role in ‘conceptualizing and 
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disseminating tacit forms of production and market knowledge, selecting good practice 
information with regard to different competence areas’. The European Commission 
also signals that, to date, KISs have hardly benefited from public measures aimed at 
sustaining their innovation activities. Indeed, the latter mainly concentrated on 
technological innovation and overlooked those activities that best characterize KISs, 
such as organizational and marketing innovations (see European Commission 2012, 
Chapter 4). Thus, implementing performance-based rewards might be an efficient tool 
to stimulate those organizational innovations that, in turn, boost firms’ efficiency and 



















TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics  




 Whole Sample H&M_Tech L&M_Tech KISs LKISs Other 
Variable Mean CV Mean CV Mean CV Mean CV Mean CV Mean CV 
TFP (levels) 1.05 0.28 1.21 0.23 0.97 0.16 1.12 0.29 0.96 0.33 1.20 0.23 
LP (Euros) 62,851 0.74 74,331 0.65 60,470 0.61 63,924 0.82 58,985 0.81 62,046 0.80 
CPRP 8.84  13.77  11.44  6.93  6.16  6.61  
Log_K_L 9.81 0.19 10.34 0.12 10.58 0.13 8.99 0.22 9.24 0.23 10.38 0.16 
Fixed_Term(%) 12.59 1.41 6.59 1.14 7.92 1.23 20.66 1.25 13.73 1.29 10.96 1.09 
Part-Time(%) 15.45 1.50 5.67 1.24 6.21 1.40 21.55 1.18 27.97 1.11 5.92 1.59 
Women(%) 36.01 0.71 27.43 0.68 30.50 0.75 47.19 0.53 44.06 0.62 13.24 0.74 
Tenure (years) 9.02 1.75 10.48 2.29 10.97 2.04 7.56 1.50 7.80 1.78 8.33 1.28 
Training(%) 24.58  16.06  19.33  30.71  23.96  38.10  
Unions(%) 48.37  57.74  59.57  32.78  46.50  47.09  
EGR(%) 18.02  14.72  18.71  17.99  18.18  20.11  
Inno_prod(%) 43.73  74.19  54.79  41.37  25.85  24.60  
Inno_proc(%) 40.40  58.32  54.26  31.23  28.79  30.16  
Export(%) 48.10  85.28  78.46  28.23  27.18  15.34  
MNE(%) 4.96  8.99  4.43  4.45  5.02  2.12  
Size(% 10-49) 41.73  39.96  38.56  55.64  31.25  47.35  
Size(% 50-250) 36.13  34.61  43.53  30.40  34.19  36.24  
Size(% >250) 22.14  25.43  17.91  13.96  34.56  16.40  
North_West(%) 31.76  38.05  31.21  33.51  29.17  27.51  
North_East(%) 26.41  27.72  27.57  28.13  23.77  24.07  
Centre(%) 20.41  16.83  21.45  19.86  20.93  22.22  
South(%) 13.47  12.81  13.48  11.27  15.06  15.61  
Islands(%) 7.95  4.59  6.29  7.24  11.08  10.58  
Ros_lagged (%) 5.83  10.34  9.53  13.51  -5.49  0.50  



















































TFP 1.00                
Labour 
Product. 
0.49 1.00               
CPRP 0.08 0.11 1.00              
Log_K_L 0.18 0.37 0.12 1.00             
Fixed_Term -0.16 -0.21 -0.08 -0.15 1.00            
Part-Time -0.35 -0.45 -0.09 -0.36 0.18 1.00           
Women -0.16 -0.20 -0.07 -0.28 0.11 0.50 1.00          
Training 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 1.00         
Tenure 0.11 0.12 0.16 0.24 -0.43 -0.23 -0.11 -0.01 1.00        
Unions 0.00 0.07 0.27 0.14 -0.24 -0.08 -0.12 0.05 0.31 1.00       
EGR 0.03 0.04 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.07 1.00      
Inno_prod 0.11 0.15 0.08 0.12 -0.12 -0.13 -0.04 0.02 0.09 0.10 0.00 1.00     
Inno_proc 0.08 0.13 0.07 0.14 -0.13 -0.12 -0.07 0.05 0.08 0.13 0.02 0.44 1.00    
Export 0.14 0.24 0.10 0.22 -0.12 -0.29 -0.11 -0.05 0.18 0.13 0.01 0.29 0.21 1.00   
MNE 0.07 0.13 0.05 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.11 -0.02 0.05 0.04 0.10 1.00  
ROS_ 
2007-2010 





Table 3 Effetcs of collective performance related pay on firm’s performances (OLS) 
Dep. Vars TFP_log Labour Productivity_log 
Explanatory vars.   
CPRP 0.045*** 0.075*** 
 (0.014) (0.028) 
Log_K_L  0.094*** 
  (0.006) 
Fixed_Term 0.000 -0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
Part-Time -0.003*** -0.009*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Women -0.001*** -0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Training -0.004 0.014 
 (0.007) (0.018) 
Tenure -0.000 -0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Unions -0.006 -0.024 
 (0.008) (0.019) 
EGR 0.008 0.019 
 (0.007) (0.020) 
Inno_prod 0.026*** 0.034* 
 (0.007) (0.018) 
Inno_proc 0.008 0.046*** 
 (0.007) (0.018) 
Export 0.051*** 0.132*** 
 (0.007) (0.021) 
MNE 0.061*** 0.286*** 
 (0.015) (0.042) 
Size Dummies yes yes 
Sector Dummies yes yes 
Geo-dummies yes yes 
Constant 0.430*** 3.276*** 
 (0.035) (0.083) 
Observations 3,806 3,806 
R-squared 0.590 0.409 

















Table 4 Effects of performance related pay on firm’s performances in different 
Technology/Knowledge intensive sectors (OLS) 
 
Dep.Var: TFP_log 
 Whole Sample H&M_Tech L&M_Tech KISs LKISs Other 
CPRP 0.045*** -0.016 0.020* 0.035 0.021 0.041 
 (0.014) (0.023) (0.011) (0.027) (0.022) (0.032) 
Control Variables yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Size Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Sector Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Geo-dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 3,806 498 1,082 889 986 351 
R-squared 0.591 0.388 0.508 0.701 0.687 0.767 
Dep.Var: Labour Productivity_log 
 Whole Sample H&M_Tech L&M_Tech KISs LKISs Other 
CPRP 0.075*** -0.059 0.071 0.125** 0.112* -0.087 
 (0.028) (0.067) (0.046) (0.063) (0.067) (0.102) 
Control Variables yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Size Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Sector Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Geo-dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 3,806 498 1,082 889 986 351 
R-squared 0.409 0.222 0.230 0.470 0.606 0.380 
Note: Other includes Mining and Quarring, Construction and Utilities. Bootstrap (for TFP) and robust standard errors in 





























Table 5 Effects of performance related pay on firm’s performances (Inverse 
Probability Weighted Regression Adjustement, IPWRA) 
 
Dep.Var: TFP_log 
 Whole Sample H&M_Tech L&M_Tech KISs LKISs Other 
CPRP_ATET 0.035*** -0.009 0.017 0.057** 0.024 0.029 
 (0.009) (0.026) (0.011) (0.025) (0.022) (0.028) 
CPRP_Pot.Outcomes 0.073*** 0.206*** 0.005 0.152*** -0.022 0.240*** 
 (0.010) (0.021) (0.009) (0.029) (0.030) (0.033) 
Control Variables yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Size Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Sector Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Geo-dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 3,806 498 1,082 889 986 351 
Dep.Var: Labour Productivity_log 
 Whole Sample H&M_Tech L&M_Tech KISs LKISs Other 
CPRP_ATET 0.062** -0.053 0.067 0.125* 0.107 -0.045 
 
(0.029) (0.074) (0.048) (0.067) (0.069) (0.125) 
CPRP_Pot.Outcomes 11.007*** 11.144*** 10.964*** 11.085*** 10.928*** 10.940*** 
 (0.022) (0.042) (0.034) (0.069) (0.054) (0.125) 
Control Variables yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Size Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Sector Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Geo-dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 3,806 498 1,082 889 986 351 
Note: Other includes Mining and Quarring, Construction and Utilities. Bootstrap (for TFP) and robust standard errors in 































Figure 1 Firms with targets related to CPRP across technology and 




























% on total firms implementing CPRP
Profit Targets Quality Targets Productivity of Teams Targets Attendance Other
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Figure 2 Firms with criteria for CPRP distribution across technology and 
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Table A.1 Production function for firm level TFP, 2007-2014 (GMM_SYS) 
Dep.Var Log (Value Added/Labour) 
Log_K_L 0.050***  
(0.018) 
Year Dummies yes 




Number of Firms 9,360 
Number of instruments 98 
Arellano-Bond test for AR1 (p_value) 0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR1 (p_value) 0.870 
Hansen Test of overid. restrictions ( p-value) 0.152 
 
















































Table A.2 Multicollinearity Test 
 
Note: the variance inflation factors test refers to the OLS regression reported in Table 3 (labour productivity 
equation). The mean VIF result is also reported for TFP equation, where only Log_K_L is omitted. As for size, 
regional and sectoral dummies, small firms (10-49), North_West and Manufacturing are the categories necessarily 
excluded from the regression, respectively.  
Variable VIF 1/VIF Variable VIF 1/VIF 
CPRP 1.12 0.89 Sectors   
Log_K_L 1.45 0.69 Mining & Quarring 1.03 0.97 
Fixed_Term 1.42 0.71 Electricity & Gas 1.04 0.96 
Part-Time 1.84 0.54 Water Supply 1.23 0.81 
Women 1.79 0.56 Construction 1.24 0.80 
Training 1.08 0.93 Wholesale & Retail Trade 1.34 0.74 
Tenure (years) 1.45 0.69 Transportation 1.26 0.79 
Unions 1.55 0.64 Accomodation & Food Serv 1.3 0.77 
EGR 1.05 0.96 Information & Comm. 1.24 0.81 
Inno_prod 1.35 0.74 Finance 1.05 0.95 
Inno_proc 1.28 0.78 Real Estate 1.03 0.97 
Export 1.63 0.61 Professional & Sc. Activities 1.27 0.79 
MNE 1.07 0.94 Administrative & Service Act 1.7 0.59 
Size   Education 1.14 0.88 
Size (50-250) 1.4 0.71 Human Health 1.28 0.78 
Size (>250) 1.77 0.56 Arts & Entert. 1.4 0.71 
Regions   Other Services 1.13 0.88 
North_East 1.37 0.73    
Centre 1.34 0.75    
South 1.33 0.75 Mean VIF 1.32  





Table A.3 Estimation of probabilities of treatment: first stage of IPWRA estimation (probit 
model)  
2nd stage Dep. Vars TFP_log Labour Productivity_Log 
1st stage Dep.Vars CPRP CPRP 
Log_K_L  0.177*** 
  (0.046) 
Fixed_Term 0.013** 0.017*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
Part-Time -0.012** -0.008 
 (0.005) (0.006) 
Women -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Training 0.425*** 0.468*** 
 (0.138) (0.146) 
Tenure 0.040*** 0.039*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) 
Unions 2.056*** 2.021*** 
 (0.203) (0.213) 
EGR -0.378** -0.279 
 (0.188) (0.195) 
Inno_prod 0.054 0.034 
 (0.137) (0.144) 
Inno_proc -0.212 -0.270* 
 (0.134) (0.142) 
Export -0.078 -0.028 
 (0.181) (0.185) 
MNE -0.297 -0.138 
 (0.245) (0.246) 
Size(50-250) 0.592*** 0.603*** 
 (0.179) (0.189) 
Size(>250) 0.849*** 0.800*** 
 (0.195) (0.208) 
Sector Dummies yes yes 
Geo-dummies yes yes 
Constant -4.649*** -5.335*** 
 (0.792) (0.829) 
Observations 3,806 3,806 












Table A.4 Effects of performance related pay on firm’s performances (Average Treatment Effects on 
Treated using Instrumental Variables) 
Dep.Var: TFP_log 
 Whole Sample H&M_Tech L&M_Tech KISs LKISs Other 
CPRP_IV_ATET 0.064 0.209** 0.070 -0.144 0.016 0.164** 
 (0.046) (0.096) (0.043) (0.102) (0.129) (0.073) 
CPRP_Pot.Outcomes 0.044 -0.012 -0.048 0.353*** -0.014 0.123 
 (0.045) (0.095) (0.043) (0.106) (0.128) (0.083) 
Control Variables yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Size Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Sector Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Geo-dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 3,803 498 1,082 889 984 350 
Correlations between unobservables -0.022 -0.220** -0.052 0.182 0.009 -0.121 
and outcome mod.0 (0.470) (0.100) (0.044) (0.110) (0.132) (0.076) 
Correlations between unobservables 0.206 -0.176 0.264 -0.536 -0.500 -0.547 
and outcome mod.1 (0.181) (0.346) (0.199) (0.374) (0.350) (0.691) 
Endogeneity Test (p-value) 
H0: treatment and outcome unobservables 
are uncorrelated 
0.462 0.106 0.258 0.108 0.360 0.201 
Dep.Var: Labour Productivity_log 
 Whole Sample H&M_Tech L&M_Tech KISs LKISs Other 
CPRP_IV_ATET 0.143 -0.413 -0.476 0.303 1.221 -2.504 
 (0.141) (0.257) (0.400) (0.295) (0.100) (3.550) 
CPRP_Pot.Outcomes 10.926*** 11.504*** 11.507*** 10.907*** 9.813*** 13.421*** 
 (0.135) (0.244) (0.218) (0.279) (0.345) (3.555) 
Control Variables yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Size Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Sector Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Geo-dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 3,803 498 1,082 889 984 350 
Correlations between unobservables -0.035 0.363 0.569** -0.125 -1.082*** 2.383 
and outcome mod.0 (0.140) (0.258) (0.300) (0.295) (0.353) (3.530) 
Correlations between unobservables 0.158 0.280 1.054 -0.081 1.140 0.510 
and outcome mod.1 (0.535) (1.605) (0.670) (1.395) (1.248) (0.591) 
Endogeneity Test (p-value) 
H0: treatment and outcome unobservables 
are uncorrelated 
0.906 0.373 0.160 0.914 0.106 0.182 
Note: Bootstrap (for TFP) and robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  













Table A.5 Average Treatment Effects on Treated using Instrumental Variables   
(Results for excluded instruments in the first-step probit) 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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iii Gibbs (2016) collects the different views of a group of leading economists in this area of research, such as Kevin 
Hallock (Cornell University), Edward Lazear (Stanford University), Kevin Murphy (USC), and Canice 
Prendergast (University of Chicago). 
iv One channel that removes these uncooperative actions is accessed when shared capitalism and collective 
performance-related pay schemes are adopted in combination with other complementary HRM practices. 
However, in the present paper, the availability of data does not allow to control for the combined role of HRM 
practices.  
v  These activities have been grouped by Eurostat in the subset of knowledge-intensive business activities (KIBS) 
but are not considered separately from the other knowledge-intensive activities in our empirical analysis. From a 
thorough analysis of KIS, it clearly emerges that complex knowledge, teamwork and the need to share knowledge 
are widespread across all sectors included in KISs, as also documented by the case studies for different industries, 
such as healthcare and education, examined by the OECD report (2006). 
vi Job titles (livelli di inquadramento) are defined by national industry-wide collective bargaining contracts, for 
which specific minimum wages apply. They are assigned according to different qualifications and skills of 
workers. 
vii According to the SICA-LCS questionnaire firms can use more than one targets and criterion when they 
implement CPRP. In addition, data are collected for both cash variable compensation and employee share 
ownership plans, that involve employees participating in firm property rights. However, the second type of 
incentives are limited diffused in Italy and are not examined in this study. Finally, note that to avoid repetitions 
we use interchangeably terms such as collective bonuses and collective incentive pay schemes, although, from 
what we discussed above they are not exactly the same thing. 
viii Unfortunately, the SICA-LCS survey does not provide similar information for individual incentives.  
ix The return on sales is the ratio of gross operating margin on total sales. 
xThe Eurostat Hi-tech classification of industries is available at 
 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/Annexes/htec_esms_an3.pdf. To avoid excessive asymmetries across 
the classes size, we had to collapse the original four classes (high-tech, med-high-tech; med-low tech, low-tech) 
into two ones. 
xi It is worth noting that the values for TFP in levels are very close to those found in the related literature dealing 
with TFP estimation for Italian firms (Altomonte and Aquilante 2012; Aiello, Pupo and Ricotta 2014). 
xii It must be remarked that we only have a binary variable for export (1 for an exporting firm, independent of the 
proportion of sales that come from selling abroad, and 0 otherwise). In addition, only firms with ten employees or 
more are in the sample. 
xiii Thus, the new variable is the past profitability, that we only use as instrument. However, the set of excluded 
instruments also includes covariates such as unions, tenure and training that proved to be highly correlated with 
CPRP and not influencing economic performances in OLS and IPWRA specifications (see section 5). 
xiv According to Chatterjee and Hadi (2012), the presence of multicollinearity relies on two rules of thumb, which 
are used to interpret the VIF test. Multicollinearity is signaled by the largest VIF (among variables) being larger 
than 10 and the mean VIF being considerably larger than 1 (above 5); Table A.2 shows that this is not true in our 
case. 
xv These results are available upon request. 
xvi It means that the specification in IV_ATET is slightly different from that we use in the OLS and IPWRA 
estimations. In the former, unions, tenure, training and EGR only enter the set of excluded instruments. Since the 
purpose of this robustness check is only to test the potential strong endogeneity of CPRP that is not corrected by 
the IPWRA method, we do not care about differences in the size of the CPRP_ATET coefficients of Table A.4 
driven by differences in the model specification. 
xvii We obtain this result despite the relevance detected in the instruments set. Table A.5, in the Appendix, reports 
findings for the first step probit, performed to calculate residuals ?̂?𝑖 . The five instruments (i.e., ROS_2007-2010, 
unions, EGR, training and tenure) are strong determinants of the treatment (CPRP) in the whole sample. Past 
profitability, unions and training remain highly significant drivers of CPRP adoption in KISs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
